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Abstract
We provide a model that explains the following empirical observations: i) private
ownership is more eﬃcient than public ownership, ii) privatizations are associated
with increases in eﬃciency and iii) the increase in eﬃciency predates the privatiza-
tion. The two key mechanisms explaining the results are: (i) a government owner
keeping control takes into account the negative eﬀect on employment of investment
and (ii) a privatizing government has a stronger incentive to invest than an acquiring
ﬁrm: the government exploits the fact that investments increase the sales price not
only due to the increase in the acquirer’s proﬁt, but also due to a reduced proﬁtf o r
the non-acquirer.
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Which is more eﬃcient: Private or public ownership? In their survey for Journal of Eco-
nomic Literature, Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 380-381) summarize the cross-sectional
and time series evidence on the relative eﬃciency of these ownership forms: ”Research now
supports the proposition that privately owned ﬁrms are more eﬃcient and more proﬁtable
than otherwise-comparable state owned ﬁrms... We know that privatization ’works,’ in
the sense that divested ﬁr m sa l m o s ta l w a y sb e c o m em o r ee ﬃcient, more proﬁtable, and
ﬁnancially healthier, and increase their capital investment spending.”
It is not clear how these results can be interpreted, however: Megginson and Netter
(2001) hail a study by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) as one of the most persuasive
articles that examines the eﬀects of privatization. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) show
that the proﬁtability of the state-owned ﬁrms increases before privatization.1 Controlling
for the degree of remaining state ownership post-privatization, they ﬁnd an inverse u-
shape of proﬁtability over a period running from ten years before the privatization to ﬁve
years after the privatization, with a top of ﬁrm proﬁtability just before the privatization.2
The authors then draw the following conclusion: If the government restructures ﬁrms
and improves their performance before privatization, then the improvements cannot be
attributed to the change in ownership.
At ﬁrst blush these empirical observations seem contradictory. In this paper we con-
struct a simple model where the change in ownership is crucial for explaining these facts.
The central mechanism is that the impending sale changes the incentives for the govern-
ment: It receives an up-front sales proceed in substitution for a stream of future beneﬁts
from control (proﬁts). The loss of control over the ﬁrm’s future decisions will change the
pre-privatization behavior in the government-owned ﬁrm: the government will have an
incentive to increase the proﬁtability pre-privatization, since the possibility of protecting
1Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) investigate the proﬁtability of privatized enterprises using a sample
of 63 privatized ﬁrms in the 1970, 1980s and 1990s.
2This result is found in multiple regression analysis when controling for GDP growth and government-
retained ownership share at the end of the ﬁscal year. The results are presented in Table 5 in Dewenter
and Malatesta (2001).
2the employees’ long-run interests is lost in the privatization process.
Strategic pre-privatization restructuring then leads to an increase in proﬁtability before
privatization in our model. The asset selling government has a stronger incentive to invest
than an ownership-keeping government or a buyer of the privatized ﬁrm, since the seller
exploits externalities on rival ﬁrms via the sales price of the sold state assets.
It should be noted that all agents in our model are fully informed and the strategic
behavior by the government is not undertaken to manipulate information about the value
of the ﬁrm. This implies that the long-run performance of the privatized ﬁr m si sn o tw o r s e
than the performance of a comparable private ﬁrm, since these costs are taken into account
by the acquiring ﬁrm when buying the privatized ﬁrm. This result is also consistent with
the results on long-run stock market performance of privatized ﬁrms found in Dewenter
and Malatesta (2001).
An implication of our model is that we may see substantial layoﬀs associated with
pre-privatization restructuring. Note that this is not inconsistent with the government
caring about employment in state-owned ﬁrms — the relative incentives to protect jobs
are lower when you are about to sell. Empirically, we observe a number of instances
with major restructuring including ﬁrings prior to privatization. For instance, Dewenter
and Malatesta (2001, p 334) mention that prior to being sold, Japan National Railways
were split into seven regional companies and employment was reduced by 200,000 people.
Other examples are British Steel which prior to its privatization cut its employment by
40 % without losing sales, and British Airways which experienced a similar reduction in
employment, while increasing the number of ﬂights (Djankov and Pohl (1997)). Lopes-de-
Silanes (1997) documents extensive pre-privatization (not always successful) restructuring
in Mexico (1983-1992). In 89 of 221 privatized ﬁrms, there were labor cuts in the two
y e a r sb e f o r ep r i v a t i z a t i o n .
Let us brieﬂy relate to the previous theoretical literature. So far, there is surprisingly
little work that analyzes the time series patterns of eﬃciency surrounding privatization.
There is a handful of papers analyzing this in settings motivated by a transition from a
planned to a market economy: Bennet and Maw (2000), for instance, examine the case
w h e r eaC o u r n o ti n d u s t r yi sp r i v a t i z e da n dR o l a n da n dS e k k a t( 2 0 0 0 )s h o wh o wt h ei n t r o -
3duction of a managerial labor market can induce managers in state-owned enterprises to
restructure in order to signal that they are good managers3 while Roland (2000) discusses
some earlier models of privatization in transition. Wang et al (2007) is somewhat related
t ot h ep r e s e n tw o r ki nt h a ti te x a m i n e st h ed u a lo b j e c t i v ef o rt h eg o v e r n m e n to fm a x i -
mizing revenue and securing employment. Some previous work shows how privatization
can trigger eﬃciency enhancing restructuring; see, for instance, Boycko et al (1996) or
Bennedsen (2000). To the best of our knowledge, strategic investments by the government
before privatization are not a feature of any previous work.4
Note that in our model, there are no distortions that would motivate state ownership.5
Determining the extent to which maximization of private proﬁt is socially desirable in
set-ups where distortions are present is outside the scope of this paper. In Section 2, we
present our model, Section 3 compares proﬁts across diﬀerent ownership structures and
Section 4 analyzes sensitivity with respect to assumptions. The paper is concluded in
Section 5.
2. The Model
We consider an oligopoly industry served by a set I of symmetric incumbent ﬁrms, where
I = {1,2,..,n,...,N}. There is also a state ﬁrm, denoted s, which might be privatized.
In a stage 1, the state ﬁr mc a nm a k ea ni n v e s t m e n tk which increases the ﬁrm’s product
market proﬁt, but decreases the product market proﬁts of the rival ﬁrms in the ensuing
product market interaction. We compare three scenarios:
Case 1: control over ﬁrm s is given to the private owner already at the beginning of stage 1.
3Debande and Friebel (2004) have another model that focuses on managers’ incentives.
4In Norbäck and Persson (2006) an similar model set-up is used to study the diﬀerence between
incumbent-ﬁnanced and venture capital ﬁnanced development.
5A caveat is in order here — there is a distortion due to oligopoly markups. Conceivably, government
ownership could be used to strengthen competition. While such arguments are sometimes given by
politicians, they fall outside typical motivations for public ownership given by economists. More generally,
the higher proﬁtability of a privatized ﬁrm may reﬂect that it ignores negative externalities or abuses a
dominant position.
4Investment in this case is made to maximize the private proﬁto ft h ea c q u i r e r .
Case 2: the government keeps the ownership of ﬁrm s in all stages of the game and invests
in stage 1.
Case 3: the government invests in stage 1, anticipating that it will privatize in stage 2.
In stage 2, the state ﬁrm is either privatized by means of a ﬁrst-price perfect information
auction, where the NI incumbent ﬁrms are the potential buyers, or it remains in the hands
of the state.
Finally, in stage 3, the incumbent ﬁrms compete in oligopoly interaction, setting an
action xi.W es o l v et h eg a m eb a c k w a r d s .
2.1. Stage 3: Product-market equilibrium
Using backward induction, we start with the product market interaction, where ﬁrm i ∈
I + s chooses an action xi ∈ R+ to maximize its product market proﬁt, Πi(xi,x−i,k),
which depends on its own and its rivals’ market actions, xi and x−i,a sw e l la st h et o t a l
amount of investment k made by the potentially privatized ﬁrm, s. We may consider
the action xi as setting a quantity or a price. To highlight the strategic eﬀect on the
investment decision in period 1, we here assume that the decision xi only aﬀects the ﬁrm’s
proﬁts and not its labor force.
We assume that there exists a unique Nash-Equilibrium in actions, x∗(k),d e ﬁned from









−i are the actions by ﬁrm i:s rivals.
Using ex-ante symmetry among incumbent ﬁrms, we only need to distinguish between
three ﬁrm types, i.e. the acquiring privately owned ﬁrm (denoted A), the government-run
ﬁrm (denoted G) and the non-acquiring ﬁrms (denoted N). The actions are then simply
xA, xG and xN,w h e r exN is one of the arguments in the vector xN of symmetric actions
taken by non-acquiring ﬁrms. We then deﬁne the reduced-form product market proﬁts of
5the acquirer, the government-run ﬁrm, and a non-acquirer as direct functions k.T ok e e p














A (kj)),j= A,G. (2.3)
N o t et h a ti nt h ec a s ew h e r et h eg o v e r n m e n to w n sﬁrm s over all stages there will be no
ﬁrm A; all private incumbents will in that case be symmetric N ﬁrms. We shall assume








> 0,a n d
dRN
dkj
< 0, j = A,G.
Assumption 1 states that the reduced-form product market proﬁt for the acquirer or the
government is strictly increasing in investments, whereas such investments strictly decrease
the rivals’ proﬁts.6 To simplify comparisons of investment incentives, in addition, we want
to ensure that RA and RG are symmetric such that for a given level of k, RA(kA)=RG(kG).
Since privatization, when an incumbent buys, will imply one less ﬁrm on the market, RA
would then be greater than RG for a given level of investment in many parameterizations.
This would be the result of increased concentration, which would obscure the comparison.
Therefore, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 2: The number of ﬁrms in the industry is constant (equal to N +1 ).
This assumption is made to make comparisons more transparent, but it is also realistic
in that an increased concentration will increase the incentives for entry. The eﬀects of
relaxing this assumption are discussed in Section 4.2.
2.2. Stage 2: Privatization of state ﬁrm
We model the privatization as a perfect information auction where the NI incumbent
ﬁrms simultaneously post bids. Each incumbent ﬁrm announces a bid, bi,w h e r eb =
6 Assumption 1 holds in the Linear-Quadratic Cournot model which is presented below, but
it is also compatible with other oligopoly models such as that presented by Farrell and Shapiro
(1996).
6(b1,...,bi,...bNI) ∈ RNI is the vector of these bids.7 The equilibrium acquisition price is
denoted by B.
We now turn to incumbent ﬁrms’ valuations of ﬁrm s,d e ﬁn e di n( 2 . 4 ) .T h eﬁrst term
shows the proﬁt for an incumbent ﬁrm when possessing the state ﬁrm and the second term
shows the proﬁt if it is obtained by a rival incumbent ﬁrm:
v = RA(k) − RN(k). (2.4)
Note that since incumbent ﬁrms are symmetric ex-ante, their valuations are symmetric.
It is then straightforward to derive the following lemma8:
Lemma 1. In the privatization, the state ﬁrm is acquired by an incumbent ﬁrm, at a
price, B, equal to a rival incumbent ﬁrm’s valuation of the state ﬁrm, i.e. B
∗ = v.
2.3. Stage 1: Investments
In subsection 2.3.1, we determine the optimal investment when the private owner invests
absent any pre-privatization investment by the government. Section 2.3.2 determines the
optimal investment for a government that owns the ﬁrm over all stages and Section 2.3.3
determines the optimal investment by the selling government. To focus on the product
market eﬀects, we assume that the government and the private owner face the same strictly
convex investment function, C(k),s u c ht h a tC0(k) > 0 and C00(k) > 0.
2.3.1. A private ﬁrm’s optimal investment




RA(k) − C(k). (2.5)
We assume RA(k)−C(k) to be strictly concave in k. The optimal choice by the acquiring





7 The acquisition is solved for Nash equilibria in undominated pure strategies. There is a
smallest amount, ε, chosen such that all inequalities are preserved if ε is added or subtracted.
8 The correct acquisition price is v − ε but, to simplify the presentation, we use v.
7Denote this optimal choice k∗
A, which is illustrated in point A in the upper diagram in
Figure 2.1.
2.3.2. A government-owned ﬁrm’s optimal investment
Following Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), we assume that the decisions in the state
ﬁrm are made by a politician, referred to as the industry minister, who cares both about
proﬁts (sales proceeds) and employment. Dewenter and Malatesta (2001), as well as many
other studies, document that government ﬁrms are more labor intensive than private
ﬁrms. Indeed, Megginson and Netter (2001, p. 356) note that "All governments fear that
privatization will cause former SOEs [state owned enterprises] to shed workers, and the key
question in virtually every case is whether the divested ﬁrm’s sales will increase enough
after privatization to oﬀset the dramatically higher levels of per-worker productivity".
Therefore, we assume that the politician cares about employment L(k), which is negatively
aﬀected by the level of capital investments k, i.e. L0(k) < 0 and L00(k) > 0. Then, the
maximization problem can be written as follows9:
Max:
{k}
RG(k) − C(k)+L(k). (2.7)
We assume RG(k) − C(k)+L(k) to be strictly concave in k. The optimal choice by the






The optimal investment when the government keeps the ﬁrm is indicated as k∗
G in the
upper diagram in Figure 2.1. Comparing expressions (2.6) and (2.8), we see that the
9The term L(k) can be seen as a measure of monetary contributions to the politician. As discussed,
we introduce this term to capture (realistic) caring of politicians about employment in state ﬁrms. All
else equal, a political owner would value the ﬁrm higher and one may wonder why politicians ever sell.
Ideology or a higher opportunity cost of taxation may be motivations: Bortolotti et al (2003) provide
evidence of many privatization decisions being subject to ﬁscal imbalances and political preferences. Such

















































Figure 2.1: Comparing investment incentives.
9government-owned ﬁrm has weaker incentives to invest than the acquiring ﬁrm, since the
government-owned ﬁrm does not only take into account the increase in proﬁts for the ﬁrm
dRG
dk , but also the negative eﬀect on labor, captured by the term L0(k),w h i c hi sn e g a t i v e
by assumption. Thus, we have derived the following result:
Proposition 1. The optimal investment by a government-owned ﬁrm is lower than the
optimal investment by the acquiring ﬁrm, i.e. k∗
G <k ∗
A.
2.3.3. A selling government’s optimal investment
When privatizing, the government is assumed to set investment levels such that the sales
price of the privatized ﬁrm is maximized. A question that arises is how a selling govern-
ment views the eﬀect of investment on employment. Here, we allow for the possibility of
government caring about employment in this ﬁrm also when losing control with a weight
θ ∈ [0,1]. If θ =1 , the government cares as much about workers after privatization as if it
controlled the ﬁrm itself. If θ =0 , it does not take into account the eﬀects on employment
at all when losing future control. Indeed, it can be argued for a government about to cede
control that it makes little sense to underinvest today. We support this claim in Section
4.1.1. In this section, we therefore allow any θ ∈ [0,1], but we focus on the case where





s.t : B(k)=RA(k) − RN(k).









where we assume that RA(k)−RN(k)+θL(k)−C(k) is strictly concave in k.T h eo p t i m a lk
for a selling government is indicated as k∗
S in the upper diagram in Figure 2.1. Comparing
expressions (2.6) and (2.10), we see that the selling government has stronger incentives to
invest than the keeping government, k∗
S >k ∗
G. The selling government also invests more
10than the acquiring ﬁrm as long as θL0(k) <
dRN
dk
. The selling government achieves a higher
acquisition price by not only taking into account the increase in proﬁts for the acquirer
dRA
dk , but also by exploiting the negative externalities on non-acquirers, captured by
dRN
dk ,
which are negative from Assumption 1. Thereby, we have derived the following result:
Proposition 2. (i) The optimal level of investment by the selling government exceeds the
optimal level of investment by the keeping government, k∗
S >k ∗




the optimal level of investment by the selling government exceeds the optimal level of
investment by the acquiring ﬁrm, i.e. k∗
S >k ∗
A.
As we shall see in Section 4, the case where θ =0has a great deal to support it, in
which case k∗
S >k ∗
A always holds. In the following, we assume that θ =0 .10
3. Proﬁts.
In Section 3.1, we compare the total long-run proﬁts for the three diﬀerent ownership
regimes: private in all stages, government in all stages, and a selling government. Total
proﬁts are then deﬁned as product market proﬁts Rh(k) minus investment costs C(k) for
the diﬀerent ownership regimes (the acquisition price is thus excluded in proﬁts or total
proﬁts). In Section 3.2, we compare pre- and post-privatization proﬁts for these three
cases. Product market proﬁts do not include any investment costs and are as deﬁned in
Section 2.1.
3.1. Total and product market proﬁts
It immediately follows from the set-up that the private owner will generate the highest total
proﬁts, since it invests in order to maximize total proﬁts. In Proposition 1 and Proposition
2, we show that the selling government overinvests relative to the optimal level and the
10This is done to simplify the exposition. The propositions that follow typically hold also when θ>0.
For instance: All that is required for Proposition 3 to hold is that the eﬀects of investment on employment
(θL0(k)) and non-acquirers (
dRN
dk
) are not perfectly equal.
11keeping government underinvests as compared to the proﬁt maximizing level. We can
directly state the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Total proﬁts are higher for the privately owned ﬁrm (case 1), RA(k∗
A) −
C(k∗
A), than for the government-owned ﬁrm (case 2), RG(k∗
G)−C(k∗
G), or for the privatized
ﬁrm (case 3), RA(k∗
S)−C(k∗
S). (ii) Total proﬁt sc a nb eh i g h e ro rl o w e rf o rt h eg o v e r n m e n t -
owned ﬁrm (case 2) as compared to the privatized ﬁrm (case 3).
We illustrate the proposition in the lower part of Figure 2.1. This, in turn, implies that
the privatized ﬁrm has the highest product market proﬁts (and the highest investment
costs) and the government ﬁrm has the lowest product market proﬁts (and the lowest
investment costs). Then, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4. The product market proﬁts for the privatized ﬁrm (case 3), RA(k∗
S),a r e
higher than the product market proﬁts for the privately owned ﬁrm (case 1), RA(k∗
A)
which, in turn, are higher than the product market proﬁts for the government-owned ﬁrm
(case 2), RG(k∗
G).
3.2. Pre- and post-privatization proﬁts, and deductions
Typically, investments have an impact on ﬁrms’ proﬁt over several periods. Empirical
examinations of privatization usually build on accounting data where the way in which
investment costs are deducted will aﬀect the results. To incorporate this aspect, we extend
the model to have two periods of product market interaction: one period before the possible
privatization (referred to as the pre-privatization period), and one period after the possible
privatization (referred to as the post-privatization period). Diﬀerent jurisdictions will have
diﬀerent accounting practices for how costs are deducted and how takeovers are treated. A
simple way of modeling deductions, that is still able to handle several cases, is to assume
that a share α of the investment costs is deducted in the ﬁrst product market interaction
period and the remaining share 1−α is deducted in the second product market interaction
period.







A(k) − (1 − α)C(k), (3.1)
where R1
A(k) is the pre-privatization period product market proﬁta n dR2
A(k) is the post-
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1(k)] − αC(k)+B(k) (3.5)




N(k)] − (1 − α)C(k), (3.6)

















To abstract for eﬀects caused by change in demand between periods, we assume
Assumption 3 (i) the proﬁt opportunities are the same in the pre-privatization prod-





−j(kj) for j = A,G and (ii) the labor well-being
opportunities are the same in the two periods, i.e. L1(kj)=L2(kj).
13I tf o l l o w st h a tt h ed i ﬀerence in the maximization problem between the private owner
and the selling government looks equivalent to the above and it follows from (3.2) and
(3.4) that the private owner invests more. Using the same reasoning as in the proof of
Proposition 3, Assumption 2, and that the investment cost share α is equal for the private
and government owner, we establish that pre-privatization and post-privatization proﬁts
are higher for the privately owned ﬁrm than for the government-owned ﬁrm.
Consider the privatized ﬁrm’s behavior which is now more involved as seen in (3.7).
It has an incentive to underinvest since it takes into account the negative eﬀect on labor
pre-privatization, but it also has an incentive to overinvest due to the strategic eﬀect on
t h es a l e sp r i c eo ft h es t a t eﬁrm. Without further assumptions, we cannot determine which
is the dominating eﬀect.
However, we can show that our model is consistent with the ﬁndings in Dewenter and
Malatesta (2001). First note that due to (3.7) and (3.4), it follows that k∗
S >k ∗
G. Then, if
α is suﬃciently low, the pre-privatization proﬁtf o rt h ep r i v a t i z e dﬁrm is higher than the
pre-privatization proﬁt for the government-owned ﬁrm. Second, if α is suﬃciently low,
it also follows that the pre-privatization proﬁtf o rt h ep r i v a t i z e dﬁrm is higher than the
post-privatization proﬁt for the privatized ﬁrm.
Thus, we have derived the following result:
Proposition 5. Proﬁts in both periods are higher for the privately owned ﬁrm than for
a ﬁrm that is owned by the government in one or both periods. Furthermore, there exist
equilibria where: (1) the proﬁt for the privatized ﬁrm in the period before privatization is
higher than the proﬁt for a state-owned ﬁrm that is not sold and (2) the pre-privatization
proﬁtf o rt h ep r i v a t i z e dﬁrm is higher than the post-privatization proﬁt for the privatized
ﬁrm.
Proposition 5 is thus consistent with a main ﬁnding in Dewenter and Malatesta (2001):
the pre-privatization proﬁtf o rt h ep r i v a t i z e dﬁrm can be higher than the post-privatization
proﬁt for the privatized ﬁrm. It could also be noted that all agents are fully informed and
the strategic government behavior is not undertaken to manipulate information about the
value of the ﬁrm. This implies that the long-run performance of the privatized ﬁrm is
14not worse than the performance of a comparable private ﬁrm, since these costs are taken
into account by the acquiring ﬁrm when buying the privatized ﬁrm. This result is also
consistent with the results on long-run stock market performance of privatized ﬁrms found
in Dewenter and Malatesta (2001).11
4. Analysis of assumptions
4.1. Favoring employees and lost future control
We saw above that even if the government cares as much about labor when intending to
sell (θ =1 )a si naﬁrm it intends to keep, there is a stronger incentive to invest in case it
intends to sell. If the eﬀects of investments on employment are suﬃciently weak, relative
to the eﬀects on non-acquirers’ proﬁts, a selling government will invest more than a private
ﬁrm. The propositions are starker when the politician does not at all take into account
the eﬀects of employment after privatization (θ =0 ). Several arguments are possible for
supporting this as a plausible case.12 Here, we explore one mechanism in some detail: If
the politicians were to underinvest in order to favor employees in the future, the acquiring
ﬁrm would sequentially invest to compensate for this.
11Moreover, Proposition 5 can also help us understand another main empirical ﬁnding in Dewenter
and Malatesta (2001˙ ): Post-privatization proﬁtability is negatively related to the government’s remaining
ownership share in a cross-section analysis. Such a partially privatized ﬁrm will maximize a combination
of proﬁt and labor well-being, and will therefore be less proﬁtable than a private ﬁrm. At the same time,
pre-privatization proﬁts can be higher than post-privatization proﬁts, due to strategic over-restructuring
behavior by the selling politician.
12One motivation is that it is easier for employees to evaluate if the politicians really made the decision
to favor them when the ﬁrm is in government hands. This, in turn, implies that the beneﬁts of favoring
employees in the future will decrease. It could also be argued, as is done by Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny
(1996), that it is more costly to subsidize a private ﬁrm than a government ﬁrm. Subsidies to private
ﬁrms are more visible and, in addition, subject to tighter legal restraints in many jurisdictions.
154.1.1. Political under-investment and sequential investment by the acquirer
Consider the set-up from Section 2.3 and assume that the private owner has an option to
invest sequentially in case the state ﬁrm is privatized. The acquiring ﬁrm’s optimal choice
of investment then depends on the level of investment made by the selling government in
the pre-privatization stage. Use kA and kS to denote the investments of the acquirer and




RA(kA) − C(kA | kS). (4.1)
C(kA | kS) denotes the cost of investing kA, given the choice of the selling government, kS.









that is, investments acquired from the selling government, kS, can be used without any
costs, whereas any additional investments are subject to the marginal cost, C0(kA),w h i c h
is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
We assume RA(kA) − C(kA | kS) to be strictly concave in kA. The optimal choice by
the acquiring ﬁrm if the selling government were not to invest at all (i.e. kS =0 ) , k∗
A,i s
then deﬁned from the unconstrained optimum condition (2.6).
For a given investment choice by the selling government, kS, the optimum investment















This optimal choice is illustrated in Figure 4.1. When k∗
A ≤ kS, the acquiring ﬁrm refrains
from investing in development and only uses the (cost-less) investment from the selling
government, k
opt
A = kS.G i v e nt h a tk∗
A >k S, the optimal investment k
opt
A = k∗
A is given by
(2.6).
























Figure 4.1: Sequential investment
to higher employment since the acquiring ﬁrm sequentially invests up to its unconstrained
optimal investment levels.
4.2. How robust is the strategic oligopolistic over-investment eﬀect?
One of the main ﬁndings of this paper is that, in equilibrium, the selling government
has a stronger incentive to restructure the state assets than the acquiring ﬁrm, since it
internalizes the negative eﬀect of restructuring on the non-acquiring ﬁrms’ proﬁtt h r o u g h
the sales price. Would these incentives remain suﬃciently strong also when relaxing some
of the assumptions made in the main analysis? In the following, we explore the sensitivity
of results to allowing for alternative selling mechanisms, allowing the non-acquiring ﬁrms to
invest, allowing privatization leading to a more concentrated product market, and allowing
ﬁrm asymmetries.
174.2.1. Alternative selling mechanisms
It has been assumed that the selling government uses a ﬁrst-price sealed bid auction. We
would argue that this auction set-up captures essential features of the bidding competition
used in practice. However, privatization can also take place using other methods, for
instance by giving away shares or vouchers to the public (this was particularly common in
the large scale privatization during Eastern Europe’s transition from planned to market
economies; see Roland (2000)). In many conceivable set-ups, the mechanisms identiﬁed
here would nevertheless be present. For instance, a government freely distributing shares
and wishing to maximize the value of this gift should invest strategically as described in
Section 2.3.3. Naturally, the exact operation of the mechanism will depend on the details
of such an alternative model.13
4.2.2. Optimal investment by the non-acquirer
Another concern is if the results are robust to allowing investments by the non-acquirers.
We explore this in a linear Cournot model which is described in the Appendix. As before,
we compare a situation where a private ﬁrm invests to maximize proﬁt to the case where a
selling government invests. For simplicity, product market interaction is a duopoly between
ﬁrm N and ﬁrm A (where the amount of capital owned by A can depend on ownership
history).
It can be shown that the acquirer’s optimal investment, denoted e k∗
A, and the subsequent
investment by the non-acquirer, denoted e k∗
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Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
160bµ − 216b2µ2 +8 1 b3µ3 − 32
. (4.5)
We can derive the government’s optimal investment, e k∗
S, and the non-acquirer’s optimal
13Biais and Perotti (2002) examine how privatizations by distributing (underpriced or free) shares can
arise due to a right-wing government that wants to make the median voter choose less redistribution. The






Λ(27b2µ2 − 44bµ +1 6 )





Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
(3bµ − 4)(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 2)
. (4.7)
From (6.11) and (4.6), it is straightforward to derive the following Lemma, as detailed in
the Appendix.
Lemma 2. In a Cournot model (linear demand, homogenous products and quadratic
investment costs), a selling government invests more than a private ﬁrm and the non-
acquirer invests less when the government sells, e k∗
S > e k∗
A and e k∗
N|S < e k∗
N|A.
Thus, the selling government’s overinvestment is a feature of the model also when we
allow the non-acquirer to invest.
4.2.3. Privatization leading to a more concentrated product market
Let us now relax Assumption A2 and let privatization lead to more concentrated market
structures than if the government had kept the ownership. The main diﬀerence from above
is that the eﬀects on the government keeping the ﬁrm and the acquirer of an increase in














holds, i.e. a larger acquirer (as compared to the government keeping the ﬁrm) would have
more to gain from increased investment. Under this assumption, the selling government
will then have an additional investment incentive due to the market concentration eﬀect.
4.2.4. Asymmetric ﬁrms: Oligopoly and monopoly
Private ﬁrms’ valuations of the state assets may diﬀer substantially. For example, the
acquirer may have ﬁrm-speciﬁc assets that match the assets for sale particularly well. In
that case, the acquirer may have a stronger incentive to restructure than the government.
The reason is that the acquisition price equals the valuation of the state assets for the ﬁrm
with the second highest valuation. This ﬁrm’s valuation might then not be so sensitive to
19restructuring, while the acquirer’s proﬁt is. However, also note that the opposite might
be true. It then follows that the government’s incentive to restructure relative to that of
the acquirer increases even further.
It should be noted that if the non-acquirers are substantially smaller than the former
state-owned ﬁrm, the government’s incentives to restructure are more closely aligned to
the investment incentives of the acquirer. The privatized ﬁrm will then essentially become
a monopolist and the sales price is close to the monopoly proﬁt. Consequently, our central
mechanism has the potential of being quantitatively important in the oligopoly case, but
not in the monopoly case or in the case of a dominant ﬁrm with a competitive fringe.
5. Concluding remarks
While many people might mainly associate privatization with the Thatcher era and the
1990s transition in formerly central planned economies, privatization remains important:
in 2007, the global proceeds from privatization were $144 billion (Privatization Barometer
(2007)). Current cases that have received attention are, for instance, Alitalia, the proposed
Swedish privatization of six major state-owned enterprises (including the maker of Absolut
Vodka) and a proposed privatization of California State Lotteries. Substantial parts of
the industry are state owned in Europe, which means that privatizations are very much
live issues. We have shown how a simple model based on two assumptions that appear
to ﬁt many privatization cases (the sales price is dependent on the market value of assets
and government ﬁrms care about employment) can generate the time series pattern of
eﬃciency around privatization documented by Dewenter and Malatesta (2001).
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6. Appendix — a Cournot model
In this Appendix, we solve the game described in Section 4.2.2. We model oligopoly
interaction in the last stage as a Cournot duopoly (ﬁrms A and N) with homogeneous
goods. We compare investments under two scenarios: i) the government owns a ﬁrm
it intends to sell and ii) the ﬁrm of interest is owned by a private ﬁrm. We compare
investments in scenario i) with investments in scenario ii). The timing and assumptions
are as described in Section 2.
6.1. Product market competition.
Let the inverse demand in the product market be given by (6.1):
P = a − b(qA + qN), (6.1)
where qA and qN are the quantities produced, a>0 is a demand parameter, and b may
be interpreted as the (inverse) size of the market. The product market proﬁtf o rﬁrm A,
ΠA(qA,q N,k A,k N),c a nb ew r i t t e n :
ΠA =( P − cA)qA, (6.2)
w h e r ew ea s s u m et h eﬁrm’s marginal cost, cA, to be decreasing in its own capital ownership:
cA = c − kA. (6.3)
Given the capital, ﬁrms’ maximization problems are:
22max
qA
(P − c − kA)qA
max
qN
(P − c − kN)qN
with associated ﬁrst-order conditions:












Λ +2 kA − kN
3b
, (6.4)
where Λ = a − c>0.
The reduced-form product market proﬁts deﬁn e di n( 2 . 2 ) ,RA(kA,k N),t a k et h ef o r m :
RA(kA,k N)=b
µ





In period 1, ﬁrms have the opportunity to invest in capital. We assume a quadratic cost






For simplicity, we assume that all ﬁrms share the same investment technology in terms of
the cost-parameter, µ.
6.2.1. Investment by Firm A
C o n s i d e rt h ec a s ew h e r eﬁrm A sets kA to maximize proﬁts ﬁrst and ﬁrm N is then allowed
to invest, which is a standard Stackelberg case. The total proﬁtf o rﬁrms A and N can be
written:
πA(kA,k N) ≡ RA(kA,k N) − C(kA), (6.7)
πN(kA,k N) ≡ RN(kA,k N) − C(kN). (6.8)














Firm A will choose its investment internalizing the non-acquirer’s behavior through the













Using the investment cost function (6.6), the reaction function (6.9) and the reduced-
proﬁt product market proﬁt( 6 . 5 ) ,i tc a nb es h o w nt h a tt h ea c q u i r e r ’ so p t i m a li n v e s t m e n t ,
denoted e k∗
A, and the subsequent investment by the non-acquirer, denoted e k∗
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Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
160bµ − 216b2µ2 +8 1 b3µ3 − 32
, (6.12)




Assume that 9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8> 0, such that there are positive investments by the non-
acquirer.
6.2.2. Optimal investment by a selling government
Now consider the case where the government intends to sell the ﬁrm of interest. The




s.t : B(k)=RA(k) − RN(k).











24The maximization problem of ﬁrm N is again
πN(kS,k N) ≡ RN(kS,k N) − C(kN),






The total proﬁtf o rﬁrm A can be written:
πA(kA,k N) ≡ RA(kA,k N) − C(kA). (6.16)
Making use of the reduced-proﬁt functions RA(kS,k N) from (6.5), the investment cost
function (6.6) and the non-acquirer’s reaction function (6.9), we can derive the selling
government’s optimal investment e k∗
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Λ(9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8 )
(3bµ − 4)(9bµ − 4)(3bµ − 2)
. (6.18)
6.2.3. Comparing investments
Let us now compare the government’s optimal restructuring e k∗









(3bµ−2)(3bµ−4)(9bµ−4)(160bµ−216b2µ2+81b3µ3−32) > 0, (6.19)






(9bµ−8)b < 0,w h e r e160bµ−216b2µ2+81b3µ3−





(9bµ−8)2b ,a n dw h e r e9b2µ2 − 20bµ +8> 0 is required for e k∗
N|A > 0
in (6.12). Investments are strategic substitutes and it follows that e k∗
N|S −e k∗
N|A =
Λ−h k∗
S
9
4µb−2 −
Λ−h k∗
A
9
4µb−2 =
h k∗
A−h k∗
S
9
4µb−2 < 0.
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